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DICTA

THE HIRSHORN CASE-AN EXTENSION OF
THE POWER OF EXECUTORS?
CARL V. LINDORFF*

A decision by the Colorado Supreme Court rendered July
11, 1949 presents an interesting problem in the drafting of wills
and their interpretation.'
The will of Hyman Hirshorn provided in part that his onehalf interest in the Algerian Club should go to ". . . all employees
who have been determined by my executor to be bona fide employees of the Algerian Club for more than one year prior to my
death." One, Georgetta Hendrickson, had been employed more or
less continuously for a period exceeding one year prior to the death
of the testator. Evidence was conflicting as to the nature and
causes of the interruptions in her employment. None of the employees had been employed continuously for one prior to the testator's death, due to a fire which necessitated closing the club for
a period. Georgetta Hendrickson was excluded by the executor
from participation in the will.
The Denver County Court made findings to the effect that
the petitioner, Hendrickson, was entitled to participate in the
will. The District Court of the City an4 County of Denver affirmed this judgment, saying in part:
In my judgment the petitioner, Georgetta Hendrickson, was a
bona fide employee of the Club Algerian. The evidence establishes,
I think, that she had worked there regularly for a period of not less
than one year prior to the death of Hyiman Hirshorn.

The Supreme Court of Colorado in a 4-3 decision reversed the
district court, holding that the will conferred upon the executor a discretionary power which should not be disturbed in the
absence of abuse of discretion. Speaking through Mr. Justice
Stone the court said: "Under such testamentary provision it
is the judgment of the executor and not the judgment of the
court which must prevail." In the minority opinion of Mr. Jus2
tice Holland, in which Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard concurred,
reference is made to this provision of the will, and it is said:
This lays bare an unequivocal direction and not discretion ....
This wording in the will before us contemplates that each and every
one who had regular employment for at least a year before the death
of the testator would share in his beneficence. Whenever any employee could establish such employment, his right to share could not
be denied, whether erroneously, arbitrarily, or capriciously.
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
Hendrickson
v. Borga .......

Colo .......

209 P.

2d 543 (1949),

tion Advance Sheet for July 14, 1949 at page 21.
2 Mr. Justice Hays dissented upon other grounds.
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OTHER CASES RECOGNIZING EXECUTOR'S DISCRETIONARY POWER

The cases are numerous in which it has been held that where
the will confers discretionary powers upon the executor, the
exercise of such powers conferred will not be the subject of judicial review unless there has been an abuse of discretion. The case
of In re Barbey's Will 3 is of striking factual similarity. After
bequeathing the residue of the assets remaining after liquidation
of a certain corporation to the testator's employees, the will provided:
The proportional interest of each such employee shall be determined by multiplying the years of his or her service by total salary,
not including bonuses, received by him or her during the twentyfour months preceding my death. I authorize my executors to determine in their absolute discretion which employees will qualify to
receive a share under this paragraph and to interpret and apply in
their discretion the formula above stated. (Emphasis added).

Two employees whose employment had not been continuous from
day to day were excluded by the executor. The court upheld his
determination on the grounds that the executor was given discretionary power to make the determination, and in the absence of
abuse of discretion the court should not disturb his finding.
A Federal case 4 is in substantial accord with the preceding
case. The will provided in part, "the existing male executor shall
act as umpire, and his determination and decision over his signature attached to this will, shall in all respects be accepted as final."
In a suit by beneficiaries, the court in upholding the decision of
the executor, said:
Ordinarily a court will not disturb the findings of an arbitrator.
But if the arbitrator refuses to act, awards upon a matter not submitted, makes an incomplete determination or commits a gross mistake or error of judgment evincing partiality, corruption or prejudice,
transcends his authority or violates some statutory requirement on
which the dissatisfied party had a right to rely or commits some other
like error, courts of equity may interfere and correct the error.

In Wait Executors v. Huntington,5 the executor of the will
petitioned the court to have the terms of the will construed. The
court denied the request holding that the terms of the will conferred this power upon the executor by the following provision:
Should any informality appear or questions arise as to the meaning or legal construction of this instrument, I hereby direct that the
distribution of my estate shall be made to such persons and associations as my executors shall determine to be my intended legatees and
devisees and their construction of my will shall be binding upon all
parties interested. (Emphasis added).

The Supreme Court of Iowa reached a similar result in a suit
by a legatee against the executor. 6 The language in the will in
that case was: "If any question of construction or meaning shall
'32 N.Y.S. 2d 191 (1941).
4American Bd. of Commissioners of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, 15 Fed. 696
W.D. Mich., 1883).
'40 Conn. 9 (1873).
'Talladega College v. Callanan, 197 Iowa 556, 197 N. W. 635 (1924).

(C.C.
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arise under this will or any question of right or dispute shall arise
as to how much anyone is entitled to, I direct that the decision
of a majority of my said executors shall be final." (Emphasis
added.)
CASES WHEREIN DISCRETIONARY

POWER WAS DENIED

The courts, however, have not always exhibited such a reluctance to disturb the decisions of those to whom such discretionary
powers have been given. In the case of Taylor v. McClave,7 the
will provided:
I declare that if any question shall arise as to the construction
and administration of my will, or any clause, matter or thing therein
contained or with relation thereto, my trustees or trustee acting
either on their or his own judgment or under professional advice and
upon such evidence as they or he shall think fit may determine such
question by writing under their hands or hand; and I declare that
such determinationshall be final and binding on all persons interested

under this my last will or any codicil thereto.

(Emphasis added).

The will provided one-fifth of trust income to be divided
equally between William Parke McClave (testator's son) and Sara
F. McClave (his wife) and provided that the whole one-fifth
should go to surviving widow of deceased son so long as she remained unmarried. William P. and Sara F. McClave were divorced and she remarried. Subsequently, the trustees construed
the will to indicate that the intention of the testator was that the
one-half of the one-fifth of the income paid to Sara should cease.
The court reversed this determination upon the grounds that
neither of the two contingencies (first Sara predeceasing her
husband, or second, William's death and Sara's remarriage) upon
which her payments were to terminate had occurred. There was
no provision for the contingency that happened. The court further stated: "This court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction
by any direction of the testator to the effect that his executor or
any other person, other than the court shall construe or define
the provisions of a will."
A similar judicial view was displayed by the highest court
of Kansas 8 in referring to a provision in the will which gave the
executor authority to determine in writing, duly signed by him,
any question as to the construction and administration-of the will,
said, "It would not . . . be conclusive if the decision should have
been erroneous and a legatee would desire a review thereof in
the regularly constituted courts."
The rule most consistent with authority would seem to be
that where a discretionary power is clearly conferred and the limits of the power are defined, its exercise will not be reviewed by
the courts unless there is a showing of improper motives or bad
7128 N. J. Eq. 109, 15 A.

2d 213 (1940).

8Lydick v. Lydick, 147 Kan. 385, 76 P. 2d 876 (1938).
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faith. But the jurisdiction of the courts is not ousted by testamentary provision attempting to give the executor final and conclusive authority on all matters in the will.
THE HIRSHORN CASE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE RULE
The courts have been reluctant to disturb the decisions of executors vested with discretionary powers. How readily should courts
construe language in wills, the meaning of which is not clear, as
having conferred such power? The writer has encountered no
other case in which language comparable to that found in the
Hirshorn will has been held to give the executor such power.
The language in the Hirshorn will which relates to this particular is: "to all my employees who have been determined by
my executor to be bona fide employees." The majority opinion
places emphasis on the fact that the testator made the bequest
to the employees "who have been determined by my executor"
to be bona fide employees. Does this provision differ from a direction that the executor is to determine and pay the testator's
lawful debts? Certainly under such testamentary language it
would not be contended that the testator intended that his creditors' rights should be made to depend upon his executor's discretion.
A brief examination of the cases hereinbefore set forth, several of which were considered by the Colorado court, readily distinguishes the language in the wills considered from that in the
Hirshorn will.
In one case 9 the testator not only provided that the executor
was to determine, but went on to explain his intent by, "in their
absolute discretion" and "to interpret and apply in their discretion." Similarly, where the will provided that the executor should
act as umpire and that his determination should be in all respects
accepted as final,10 there is obviously an intention to grant to the
executor something beyond his usual authority. It would also
seem that where the powers granted are prefaced by such language as "should any informality appear or questions arise" 11 or
"if any question of construction or meaning shall arise," 12 it is
fairly evident that the testator's intention was to provide an extrajudicial means of settling controversial issues. Inasmuch as the
intent of the testator is to be ascertained from the four corners
of the will, such expressions should be considered since they
illuminate the words which follow.
The language employed in the Taylor case 13 and in Lydick
In re Barbey's Will, supra note 3.

10American Bd. of Commissioners of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, supra note 4.
11 Wait Executors v. Huntington, suvra note 5.

12Talladega College v. Callanan, supra note 6.
Is Supra note 7.
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v. Lydick 14 is equally unambiguous. The courts in these cases
simply denied the power of the testator to so hamper the judiciary.
It is inescapable that the decision in the Hirshorn case results in requiring less positive language that the testator intended
to grant discretionary powers to his executor than precedents
previously have required. It is noteworthy that nowhere in the
Hirshorn will were the duties of the executor likened to those of
an umpire, arbitrator,or a judge. Nowhere in the will is there
indication that determinations of the executor are to be final, discretionary, or binding.
The law of Colorado as represented by the Hirshorn case
makes it advisable to reexamine existing wills for words which
might be construed to grant the executor broader powers than
intended. In drafting wills in the future where the intention is
to create no powers of this nature, it would seem advisable to
avoid such language as: "I direct my executor to determine" or
"to such persons as my executor has determined." This can be
done by merely defining the objects of the testamentary disposition as: "to all employees who have been with the firm for not
less than one year immediately prior to my death." While the duty
to make the preliminary decision will thus devolve upon the same
person, the finality of the determination will be materially affected.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
B.S. IN PSYCHOLOGY
In reply to the article in the July, 1950, Dicta, by Robert B. Parks, I should
like to state that it must be apparent that if the losing of functional utility is
verbalized into normal activity channels, the socio-economic level will result In
a tendency to maladjustment. The net positive value of the environment interrelated with the socio-legal aspects of adjustmental pattern of the mores focalized on the social response considering sociability levels and status need, will
invariably result in the functional criteria "B". Deviate behavior, however,
considered together with chronicity behavior dynamics and considering also net
positive value of the environment in terms of maturation is obvious. Affectliaison without ego support must, of necessity, result in disfunctioning super-ego
(or lack of it). Distorted acquisition is held by some authorities to result in an
affect-distortion ratio in the societal group criterion "S". All of these factors
(or the lack of them) considering the interpersonal security of faulty developmental relationships in terms of frustration factors properly determinant in
a series of well-known studies will always result in a tendency toward the
ratio "BS".
Non-psychological Law-oriented reader,
FRANcIs L.
4 Supra

note 8.

SHALLENBERGER.

